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Notes
Beyond Control and Without Fault or
Negligence: Why Japan Should Be Excused
from Meeting Its Kyoto Protocol Obligations
Regina Durr
The purpose of this Note is to show how force majeure can excuse Japan from its reduced
CO2 emissions target due under the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol is the first and
only binding international agreement to reduce CO2 emissions amongst industrialized
and developing countries. This Note draws upon contract principles and data sources,
including political news sources and environmental studies, to demonstrate how the
elements of a force majeure event were met in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami of
March 2011 that led to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Through
showing how far-reaching simultaneous acts of God can be, this research highlights the
importance of a holistic approach in shaping the enforcement of an international
agreement like the Kyoto Protocol.

 J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California Hastings College of the Law; Senior Notes
Editor, Hastings Law Journal; Law in Japan Certificate, Meiji University; B.A., University of
Washington. I wish to personally thank the following people for their insights and editorial assistance
throughout the development of this Note: Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, Professor Brian E. Gray, and
the Hastings Law Journal Notes Team, Staff Editors, and Executive Board. Many thanks also to Riley
Moyer whom I have great admiration for and support I am grateful for. Deep gratitude is also owed to
my parents, Leah and Richard Durr, who have taught me how to stay humble and be resilient,
challenge me to do better, and work tirelessly to make my dreams possible—I hope I make you proud.
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Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement that aims to reduce
1
carbon dioxide (“CO2”) emissions and the presence of greenhouse gases.
Countries that ratified the Kyoto Protocol are required to reach their
2
respective reduced CO2 emissions target. To meet their reduced CO2
emissions target, countries have had to restructure their energy portfolios
to include low CO2 emissions energy sources. For example, Japan has
restructured its domestic energy portfolio to include nuclear power to
effectuate its CO2 emissions target of seven percent below its 1990 level
3
of CO2 emissions. Feeling confident that Japan would meet its target, in
2010 Japan imposed upon itself a twenty-five percent reduction target for

1. See infra Part I.A.
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part II.A.1.
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2020 and an eighty percent target for 2050 in Copenhagen. Japan’s
commitment to the Kyoto Protocol has been a great source of pride for
the nation domestically and internationally.
While nuclear power has been an attractive political tool to
demonstrate Japan’s commitment to the Kyoto Protocol, the energy source
5
has been disparaged amongst the public of Japan. Specifically, support of
nuclear power in Japan has decreased since the Fukushima Daiichi
6
Nuclear Power Plant (“Fukushima NPP”) disaster on March 11, 2011.
The occurrence of the Fukushima NPP disaster brought to light safety
concerns prompting the public to implore the government to cease
construction of new nuclear power plants and to decommission existing
7
nuclear power plants. Japan was forced to reassess the role of nuclear
power in its efforts to meet its Kyoto Protocol targets, leading it to reduce
8
its nuclear energy supply and diversify its energy portfolio. In fact, Japan’s
energy portfolio now focuses on fossil fuel and nonrenewable energy even
9
though those energy sources thwart CO2 emissions reduction plans.
The Fukushima NPP disaster also forced Japanese political parties
to reassess their positions on nuclear power in Japan. The Fukushima
NPP disaster demonstrated the dangers of nuclear power, and influenced
then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s radical shift from being a nuclear power
10
proponent to being antinuclear. In fact, shortly after the disaster, Prime
11
Minister Kan declared Japan would phase out nuclear power all together.
Eventually, Prime Minister Kan would resign due to poor approval rate
12
and handling of the Fukushima NPP disaster.
Prime Minister Kan’s immediate successor, Prime Minister Yoshihiko
Noda, was elected in 2011 on the platform that Japan would instead
13
reduce, not eliminate, use of nuclear power. Under Prime Minister
Noda, Japan would not build new nuclear power plants nor extend the

4. Sven Rudolph, Carbon Markets in Japan: Recent Experiences from CO2 Cap-and-Trade at the
National and Local Level, 6 Carbon & Climate L. Rev. 354, 354 (2012); Ministry of the Env’t, Gov’t
of Japan, Overview of the Bill of the Basic Act on Global Warming Countermeasures 1 (Oct. 8,
2010), http://www.env.go.jp/press/files/en/387.pdf.
5. See Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law, 2011
BYU L. Rev. 1937, 1956–57.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1957–58.
9. Japan: International Energy Data and Analysis, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/
beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=JPN (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
10. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Premier Wants Shift Away from Nuclear Power, N.Y. Times, June 14,
2011, at A6.
11. Davies, supra note 5, at 1957; see also Peter Drysdale, Japan’s Energy Options After
Fukushima, E. Asia Forum (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energyoptions-after-fukushima/.
12. Drysdale, supra note 11.
13. Davies, supra note 5, at 1958; Drysdale, supra note 11.
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life spans of outdated ones. One year later, Noda was defeated by
former Prime Minister Shinto Abe who pledged to move Japan away
from nuclear power entirely. While elected on an antinuclear platform,
Prime Minister Abe took “a closer look at nuclear power” and “within a
15
week in office” began a plan to build nuclear power reactors. This
radical shift on use of nuclear power has driven down Prime Minister
Abe’s approval ratings as Japan’s ongoing use of nuclear power continues
16
to spark public outcry. The Fukushima NPP disaster thus has made
nuclear power a decisive issue for prime minister elections.
While prime ministers have been elected on a pro or antinuclear
power platform, the legislative branch of the Japanese government (“the
Diet”) remains uncommitted to any nuclear policy. The Diet established
a committee “to investigate the direct and indirect causes” of the
Fukushima NPP disaster in order to propose new policy, reduce and
17
prevent future nuclear disasters, and reduce damage on the plant itself.
This committee, however, was mandated not to “study matters related to
the future energy policies of Japan, including the promotion or abolition of
nuclear power,” or to even “study government administrative policies and
18
regulations.” As a result of these affirmative acts to limit its understanding
of nuclear energy policy, the Diet is ignorant of any and all nuclear policy
19
Accordingly, revisions and amendments of laws and
options.
20
regulations are undertaken on a “patchwork” basis. The Diet’s reactive
actions combined with its inability to agree on one nuclear power policy
has led the Diet to remain uncommitted to any nuclear policy. Elected
officials are too weary of any political fallout that might come upon them
if they take a strong stance on nuclear power. Thus, an environmental
and political analysis that studies the role of the Fukushima NPP in
21
pursuing a non- or low-carbon Japan is needed.
Until now, different studies have come to contrasting conclusions
about whether Japan will be able to fulfill its Kyoto Protocol obligations
in the aftermath of the Fukushima NPP disaster. The studies do not,
however, analyze Japan’s legal right to be excused, domestically and
14. Drysdale, supra note 11.
15. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan’s New Leader Endorses Nuclear Plants, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2012, at A8.
16. Alexander Martin, Japan Restarts Nuclear Power After Two-Year Shutdown, Wall St. J.
(Aug. 11, 2015, 12:16 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-restarts-first-reactor-since-fukushima-disaster1439259270.
17. See Nat’l Diet of Japan, The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission (2012), http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/
wp-content/uploads/2012/09/NAIIC_report_lo_res10.pdf.
18. Id. at 11.
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id.
21. Davies, supra note 5, at 1963; André Semmler, Renewable Energy in Japan: New Competition
in the Energy Market After Fukushima 5 (Columbia Univ., Sch. of Int’l Pub. Affairs, Apr. 17, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2124157.

J - Durr_15 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

February 2016]

BEYOND CONTROL AND WITHOUT FAULT

2/9/2016 1:43 PM

503

internationally, from the requirements of the Kyoto Protocol due to the
Fukushima NPP disaster. This Note argues that Japan’s reduced CO2
emissions targets established by the Kyoto Protocol have been frustrated
by the unanticipated events of the Fukushima NPP disaster. While
similar nuclear disasters have occurred overseas in 1979 and 1986, no
country has ever experienced an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power
22
plant disaster collectively on one single day. Therefore, Japan should
use the Fukushima NPP disaster as a legal justification for failing to meet
its reduced CO2 emissions targets obliged under the Kyoto Protocol.
Japan has a legal right to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol
domestically and internationally under a force majeure argument.
However, Japan has not exercised this right in fear that withdrawing will
yield more serious international and domestic political consequences
than an outright breach. Nevertheless, this Note argues that Japan should
make a force majeure argument in order to justify not meeting its Kyoto
Protocol targets and avoid international penalties in exiting from the
Kyoto Protocol.
This Note will answer the following outstanding issues: (1) Whether
Japan’s carbon emissions have increased naturally or as a result of the
Fukushima NPP disaster; (2) What will be the domestic and international
implications of Japan carrying out the reduced nuclear power policy
following the Fukushima NPP disaster; (3) Whether Japan’s noncompliance
with the Kyoto standards is excusable and, if so, what the consequences
of this are; and (4) How Japan’s emissions limitations should be adjusted
to account for the aftermath of the Fukushima NPP disaster. Part I of
this Note will explain the Kyoto Protocol, the international agreement at
issue, and the events of the Fukushima NPP disaster. Part II will provide
an analysis of how the Fukushima NPP disaster affected Japan’s energy
portfolio, energy policies, and compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Part
III will discuss why Japan will not comply with the Kyoto Protocol and
why Japan should be excused from its obligations under the international
agreement. It will also demonstrate how Japan can successfully be
excused from those obligations under force majeure.

22. On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island disaster near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania occurred
when the nuclear fuel rods inside the reactor experienced a partial meltdown—meaning some of them
overheated and melted. There, the radioactive material never escaped the containment vessel. On
April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl disaster near Kiev, Ukraine occurred because the core had not been
shut down prior to a test. The power surge triggered events that sent the nuclear reaction out of
control, causing two explosions. The reactor was not surrounded by a containment structure, so the
explosions and the subsequent fire sent a giant plume of radioactive material into the atmosphere that
was dispersed by the winds. See Toshio Serita & Peng Xu, The Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Damage
Compensation Resolution and Energy Stock Returns (Dec. 7, 2012) (manuscript at 1), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136060.
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I. Background: The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on December 11,
1997 and entered into force on February 16, 2005, is the first and only
binding international agreement to reduce CO2 emissions amongst
23
industrialized and developing countries. Over 150 countries sent
representatives to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change’s (“UNFCCC”) meeting in Kyoto, Japan, to create a binding
24
agreement to address international climate change. At the meeting,
thirty-seven industrialized nations agreed to cut their CO2 emissions by
at least “5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 and
25
2012.” For example, Canada agreed to cut its CO2 emissions level six
26
percent below its respective 1990s CO2 emission levels. Countries in the
European Union took a stronger stance and agreed to cut their emissions
27
eight percent below their respective 1990 CO2 emissions levels.
Relevant to this Note, Japan agreed to cut its emissions six percent below
28
its 1990 CO2 emissions level. While the Kyoto Protocol bound those
thirty-seven industrialized nations, forty-seven other industrialized and
developing countries signed with the intent to later opt into the
29
agreement to demonstrate commitment to the global environment. This
comprehensive agreement is the Kyoto Protocol, and currently 192 parties
(191 countries and one regional economic integration organization) have
30
become signatories and are thus bound to reduced CO2 emissions targets.
31
Now, commitments due under the Kyoto Protocol are expiring.

23. See Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Fiona Harvey, World
Headed for Irreversible Climate Change in Five Years, IEA Warns, Guardian (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change..
24. Nicola Armaroli & Vicenzo Balzani, Energy for a Sustainable World: From the Oil
Age to a Sun-Powered Future 111 (2011).
25. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, Dec.
11, 1997 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
26. Id. annex B.
27. Id.
28. Id. It is also important to recognize that Japan continued its commitment to CO2 emission
reduction in 2010 by adding a twenty-five percent reduction target for 2020 and an eighty percent
target for 2050 in Copenhagen. Rudolph, supra note 4; Ministry of the Env’t, Gov’t of Japan, supra
note 4.
29. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited
Feb. 8, 2016).
30. Id.
31. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 3.
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A. Expiration and Extension Periods
The Kyoto Protocol consists of two commitment periods: 2008 to
2012 and 2013 to 2020. In 1997, signatories to the Kyoto Protocol agreed
that their commitments and obligations would start in 2008 and end in
32
2012. This is known as the first commitment period. Later on December
8, 2012 in Doha, Qatar, the “Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol”
was adopted by a majority of Kyoto Protocol signatories to establish a
33
second commitment period. The second commitment period began in
34
2013 and will end in 2020. In effect, the second commitment period
extends the life of the Kyoto Protocol and makes major amendments to
the original obligations.
The second commitment period has more aggressive CO2 emissions
reduction targets than the first commitment period. While the first
commitment period aimed to reduce CO2 emissions by an average of five
percent, the second commitment period aims to reduce CO2 emissions
levels by at least eighteen percent below 1990 levels. As a result, the
composition of obliged countries in the second commitment period is
different from the first. In fact, forty-four countries, some of which did
not ratify the initial Kyoto Protocol, have only ratified the second
35
phase. Moreover, despite not ratifying the second phase, countries such
as the United States and India have adopted a domestic version of the
36
Kyoto Protocol to curb global CO2 emissions. In the alternative, some
countries that did ratify the initial Kyoto Protocol have not ratified the
37
second phase. For example, Japan, New Zealand, and the Russian
38
Federation have not ratified the second commitment period. Despite
the differing composition of the two commitment periods, the original
Kyoto Protocol obligations persist under the Doha Amendment.
Thereby, the Kyoto Protocol remains pertinent for discussion.

32. Harvey, supra note 23.
33. See Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Treaty Collection,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&lang=en
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
34. Id.; see also Status of the Doha Amendment, United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php (last visited Feb.
8, 2016).
35. Compare Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, annex B, with Status of the Doha Amendment, supra
note 34.
36. Emily Atkin, Reports: Japan Will Promise to Reduce Carbon Emissions 20 Percent by 2030,
Climate Progress (Apr. 9, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/04/09/3644893/japan
-climate-change-pledge-maybe/.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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B. Compliance Mechanisms
To effectuate the Kyoto Protocol, attendees of the meeting created
a carbon credit scheme. Carbon trading is a market-based tool to limit
greenhouse gas emissions and is set out in Article 17 of the Kyoto
39
Protocol. Carbon trading “allows countries that have emissions units to
spare—emissions permitted them but not ‘used’—to sell this excess
40
capacity to countries that are over their targets.” These credits are an
important component of each country’s strategy to reduce CO2 emissions
because they count toward the country’s CO2 emissions target. The
Kyoto Protocol’s carbon credit scheme has three mechanisms that help
the thirty-seven bound countries achieve their respective reduced CO2
emissions targets: emissions trading, joint implementation, and the clean
41
development mechanism.
First, obliged countries “may participate in emissions trading for the
42
purposes of fulfilling their commitments” under the Kyoto Protocol.
Emissions’ trading allows developed countries to trade emissions units
43
amongst themselves. Emissions’ trading is beneficial for countries who
have rapidly and successfully reduced their domestic CO2 emissions
44
through various acts and therefore have unused emissions units. These
countries with a surplus of carbon credits may then sell their excess
credits to another obliged country that has exceeded its CO2 emissions
45
target.
Second, the joint implementation mechanism allows one obliged
country to invest in CO2 emissions reduction projects in another obliged
46
country. When an obliged country carries out or finances a climate
protection project in another obliged country, the investing obliged
country can credit the resulting emissions reductions to offset its initial
47
allocation of carbon credits. The recipient country will “gain foreign

39. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 17.
40. International Emissions Trading, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/emissions_trading/items/2731.php (last visited
Feb. 8, 2016).
41. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 12, 17; see also Sven Rudolph & Friedrich Schneider, Did
the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor’s Orders? Mostly No! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan Before and After the Earthquake 4 (CESifo Working Paper
No. 3639, Nov. 2011).
42. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 17.
43. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties Serving as the
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 17–20 (Mar. 30,
2006).
44. Emissions Trading, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2880.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
45. Id.
46. Joint Implementation, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2882.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
47. See id.
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investment and advanced technology” and cannot use this mechanism to
48
achieve more carbon credits than it was initially allocated. The Joint
implementation mechanism is beneficial to countries that seek to
produce energy cheaper elsewhere and “realize greater cuts in emissions
49
by doing so.”
Third, the clean development mechanism (“CDM”) works in a
similar way to joint implementation; the main difference, however, is that
CDM projects are jointly carried out by a developed country with a
reduction commitment and a developing country without a reduction
50
commitment. With CDM, a developed country carries out an emissionssaving climate protection project in a developing country, and these
saved unitscertified emissions reductionscan be credited to the
51
developed country’s account. The goal of the CDM is not only, as with
the first two mechanisms, to make emissions reductions more “costeffective and offer[] a greater degree of flexibility to industrialized
52
countries trying to meet their targets[;]” it also serves to assist
developing countries, through technology transfer, in establishing a
53
climate-friendly economy. While the Kyoto Protocol permits all three
mechanisms, the use of these mechanisms must be “additional” to
54
domestic reduction measures. In sum, no country may comply with its
CO2 emissions reduction commitments exclusively through the use of
these three mechanisms.
C. Noncompliance Grounds
An obliged country might intentionally or unintentionally not
comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Intentional noncompliance is caused by
deliberate acts to escape that country’s obligations whereas unintentional
55
noncompliance is caused often by incapacity. Important for this Note, at
least two types of incapacity may be distinguished: financial incapacity
56
and administrative incapacity. Financial incapacity occurs when a
57
country has inadequate economic resources to ensure compliance. On the
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The Clean Development Mechanism, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2881.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 6.
55. Abram Chayes et al., Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective, in Engaging
Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords 39–41, 52–54
(Edith B. Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998).
56. David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How Compliance Happens and Doesn’t Happen
Domestically, in Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International
Environmental Accords, supra note 55, at 20–23.
57. Id.
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other hand, administrative incapacity refers to inadequate bureaucratic
58
resources to issue rules and regulations and to monitor enforcement.
These forms of incapacity relate to whether the noncompliance was
59
“treaty-induced.”
However, an obliged country might also fail to meet its Kyoto
60
Protocol obligations by inadvertence. Noncompliance by inadvertence
refers to when no behavior of the country contributes to the existence of a
spontaneous happening, such as an earthquake and tsunami, which
prevents fulfillment of contractual obligations. Inadvertence is also called
an event of force majeure:
[A] “Force Majeure Event” means any event beyond the reasonable
control of the person affected including, without limitation, labour
dispute, act of God, war, act or circumstance of terrorism, riot, civil
commotion, malicious damage, accident, breakdown of essential
computer software, hardware or system failure, fire, flood and/or storm
and other unforeseen circumstances materially and adversely affecting
61
the performance [of the country].

When a force majeure event causes noncompliance, “for so long as the
circumstances continue, [the country] shall be relieved of its obligations
under the Terms and Conditions which it has been prevented from
62
fulfilling as a result of that Force Majeure Event without liability.” Of
course, the obliged country must still “take all reasonable and practical
steps to minimize any loss and/or disruption resulting from any such Force
63
Majeure Event.” The impact of an “act of God” depends on the size
and composition of the obliged country, and can lead to noncompliance
64
entirely.
D. Consequences of Noncompliance
Article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol handles noncompliance of obliged
countries by requiring failing countries to “approve appropriate and
effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and address cases of
65
noncompliance.” To effectuate the “procedures and mechanisms” of
failing countries, the Kyoto Protocol establishes a compliance mechanism
comprised of two branches: the facilitative branch and enforcement

58. Id.
59. Chayes et al., supra note 55, at 40.
60. Id.
61. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties
Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Tenth Session, held in Lima from 1 to
14 December 2014, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2014/9/Add.1 6 (Feb. 2, 2015) [hereinafter UNFCCC
Lima Report].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 18.
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branch. The facilitative branch provides “advice and assistance” to
obliged countries to promote compliance and prevent noncompliance,
whereas the enforcement branch is empowered with the “responsibility
67
to determine consequences for Parties not meeting their commitments.”
Thus, the enforcement branch only has discretionary authority to make a
finding of noncompliance, and has further discretion to impose hard
consequences like financial penalties and trade sanctions once
noncompliance has been found. Nonetheless, even these discretionary
powers may be discredited when a failing country exercises its right to
request “to have its eligibility restored if it believes it has rectified the
68
problem and is again meeting the relevant criteria.” Accordingly,
questions arise as to whether the decisions of the enforcement branch are
legally binding.
The enforcement branch is afforded three means to enforce
compliance upon failing obliged countries. First, the noncompliant country
must present a plan demonstrating how it intends to restore compliance
69
with the Kyoto Protocol. This plan may account for additional costs of
buying carbon credits. For example, if an obliged country expects its CO2
emissions would be thirty percent above its reduction target, the country
70
would be forced to buy carbon credits to make its targets. Such an act
“would cost the country nearly $14 billion” to remain part of the Kyoto
71
Protocol. Second, in the next commitment period, it must cover its
deficit, plus another thirty percent of that deficit, in addition to whatever
72
its commitment would be for that period. Finally, the country loses its
eligibility to sell carbon credits under the carbon trading mechanism of
73
the Kyoto Protocol. If a country fails these three paths toward
compliance, then the failing country will be suspended from participating

66. An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last
visited Feb. 8, 2016). The Kyoto Protocol’s compliance system is laid out by the Marrakesh Accords,
which establish both the facilitative branch and enforcement branch. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See Matthew Carr, Japan May Declare Force Majeure on Kyoto Protocol, Orbeo Says,
Bloomberg Bus. (Mar. 14, 2011, 10:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-0314/japan-may-declare-force-majeure-on-kyoto-protocol-orbeo-says; see also Bryan Walsh, Bienvenue
au Canada: Welcome to Your Friendly Neighborhood Petro-State, Time Mag. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://science.
time.com/2011/12/14/bienvenue-au-canada-welcome-to-your-friendly-neighborhood-petrostate/.
71. Walsh, supra note 70.
72. Legal Response Initiative, Kyoto Compliance Mechanism ¶ 5 (July 19, 2010),
http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BP12E-Briefing-Paper-KyotoComplianceMechanism-19-July-2010.pdf.
73. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on
its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002).
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in further Kyoto Protocol discussions. Notably, that failed country may
only incur binding consequences when an “amendment” saying so has
75
been adopted into the Kyoto Protocol. Because an amendment requires
three-fourths ratification of participating countries, the Kyoto Protocol
has not, and arguably does not, lend itself well to the establishment of
76
hard sanctions for noncompliance.
E. Withdrawal Methods
When an obliged country wishes to withdraw in anticipation of
noncompliance the Kyoto Protocol provides two methods of withdrawal:
77
explicit “written notification” or implied force majeure. Article 27 of
the Kyoto Protocol handles withdrawal of obliged countries by requiring
the country to “giv[e] written notification” and placing conditions upon
78
complete withdrawal. For example, the “written notification” may only
79
be given after three years of compliance efforts. Because the Kyoto
Protocol was entered into force on February 16, 2005, then by definition
the earliest withdrawal notification may have been given on February 16,
80
2008. Also, “written notification” does not serve as immediate
withdrawal. Instead, “withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one
year from the date of receipt . . . of the notification of withdrawal, or on
81
such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.”
Therefore, assuming an obliged country provided written notification on
the first available day and that was received by the UNFCCC on the
same day, a country could withdraw no earlier than February 16, 2009.
Despite this early date, Canada became the first country to “exercise its
legal right to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol” by giving
82
written notification to the UNFCCC on December 15, 2011. Canada
withdrew because it anticipated it “would have had to purchase a
significant and costly amount of international credits using funds that
83
could be invested” domestically during an economic crisis. True to its
word, in 2012, Canada abandoned all efforts to meet its reduced CO2
emissions target and has successfully withdrawn from the Kyoto

74. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 6, 12, 17.
75. See An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, supra note 66.
76. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 20.
77. See id. art. 27.
78. Id. (“At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into force
for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.”).
79. Id.
80. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 23.
81. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 27.
82. Env’t Can., A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto Protocol
Implementation Act 5 (May 2012).
83. Id.
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84

Protocol. It is expected countries might likewise exercise their legal
right to withdraw under this method to escape obligations in the second
commitment period despite those countries having had twelve years to
85
comply with their Kyoto Protocol obligations.
In the alternative, a country may withdraw when noncompliance is a
86
result of a force majeure event. As stated earlier, “any event beyond the
reasonable control” of the country, including a simultaneous earthquake
and tsunami, may excuse the country from its Kyoto Protocol obligations
“so long as such circumstances continue” and prevent the country from
87
fulfilling its obligations. Therefore, should a country experience a force
majeure event and expect to not reach its CO2 emissions targets, a
country may successfully declare force majeure to withdraw and prevent
having to implement new compliance mechanisms, including buying
additional emissions permits. While no country has exercised this implied
withdrawal method yet, other countries have used contractual loopholes
to escape obligations under other international agreements. For example,
the International Whaling Convention (“IWC”) in 1986 banned the practice
88
of commercial whaling. Despite having initially signed the IWC
agreement, Norway and Iceland exercised the IWC’s escape clause to
89
resume commercial whaling operations. Similarly, this Note argues that
Japan’s reduced CO2 emissions targets established by the Kyoto Protocol
have been frustrated by the unanticipated events of the Fukushima NPP
disaster.
F.

The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Disaster

On March 11, 2011 at 14:46 JST, Japan’s most powerful recorded
90
earthquake hit with a magnitude of 9.03. The Great East Japan
Earthquake produced a powerful tsunami that reached heights of up to
91
131 feet and traveled up to 6.2 miles inland. The tsunami inundated
about 216 square miles, and caused 15,893 deaths, 6152 injuries, and 2572

84. Id.
85. The date represents twelve years of compliance efforts under the logic that a country signed
the Kyoto Protocol at the conference on December 11, 1997 and immediately began efforts to comply
with its Kyoto Protocol obligations to prepare for the enforcement period beginning February 16, 2005.
86. UNFCCC Lima Report, supra note 61, at 6.
87. Id.
88. Which Countries Are Still Whaling?, Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, http://www.ifaw.org/
united-states/our-work/whales/which-countries-are-still-whaling (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
89. Id.
90. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Hrabrin Bachev & Fusao Ito, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster—
Implications for Japanese Agriculture and Food Chains (Sept. 3, 2013) (manuscript at 1),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319767; Int’l Atomic Energy Agency, Mission
Report: International Fact Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Accident
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 19 (June 2, 2011).
91. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1; Int’l Atomic Energy
Agency, supra note 90, at 19.

J - Durr_15 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

512

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

2/9/2016 1:43 PM

[Vol. 67:499

92

missing people. The combined earthquake and tsunami also destroyed
properties along the northeast coast of Japan. One report stated that the
natural disasters caused 121,782 buildings to totally collapse, an
additional 278,049 buildings to “half collapse,” and a further 726,110
93
buildings to be partially damaged. Important for this Note, one of those
damaged buildings was the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
94
(“Fukushima NPP”). In the course of that damage, the Fukushima
NPP’s cooling system began to fail, causing large explosions, Level 7
95
meltdowns and, subsequently, a huge release of radioactivity into the
96
environment. The incidents surrounding the Fukushima NPP disaster
classified it as one of the world’s largest nuclear disasters to date and
served as a catalyst to force Japan to reevaluate its energy portfolio, both
97
domestically and internationally.
II. Analysis: Japan Post-Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Disaster
The Fukushima NPP disaster led to a strong shift in Japan’s energy
portfolio, driven by safety concerns and public outcry solidly disfavoring
98
use of nuclear power. Before the Fukushima NPP disaster, two-thirds of
the Japanese public regularly supported increasing the number of
99
nuclear power plants. Now, the same percentage of residents opposes
100
the use of nuclear power in Japan. Another poll showed seventy-four
percent of Japanese citizens supported the phase out of nuclear power
post-Fukushima, while another sixty percent expressed little or no

92. Robert Dinwiddie, Ocean: The Definitive Visual Guide 463 (2014); Nat’l Police Agency
of Japan, Emergency Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters, Damage Situation and Police
Countermeasures Associated with 2011 Tohoku District off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake
(Dec. 10, 2015).
93. Nat’l Police Agency of Japan, supra note 92.
94. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1; Int’l Atomic Energy
Agency, supra note 90, at 19.
95. A Level 7 meltdown is the highest level a nuclear event can reach according to the
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, and is defined as “[a] major release of radioactive
material with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of planned and
extended countermeasures.” Talea Miller, Rating Nuclear Accidents and Incidents: Which Were the
Worst?, PBS Newshour (Mar. 18, 2011, 11:40 AM), www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/worst-nuclearaccidents-in-history/; see also The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, Int’l Atomic
Energy Agency, www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/ines.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
96. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1; Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1.
97. See Bachev & Ito, supra note 90, at 1.
98. Kerin Cantwell et al., Japan’s New Energy Market, in Global Project Finance––Energy,
Project Perspectives 2122 (Summer 2012), https://www.akingump.com/images/content/4/4/v4/4462/
Project-Perspectives-Newsletter-Summer2012.pdf.
99. See Young-Doo Wang et al., Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Policy, International Energy
Policy in the Aftermath of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: An Analysis of Energy Policies of
the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, Japan, China and Korea (2013).
100. Id.
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101

confidence in the safety of the technology. Such public aversion was
illustrated immediately after the Fukushima NPP disaster when tens of
thousands of demonstrators gathered in Tokyo, and thousands more
assembled elsewhere across Japan, to demand a permanent shutdown of
102
the nation’s nuclear plants. Shortly thereafter, public outcry continued
103
to build and weekly demonstrations took place throughout the nation.
For example, two months after the Fukushima NPP disaster, nearly 5500
people attended an antinuclear energy rally in Tokyo to celebrate
together as the last of the nation’s fifty nuclear reactors was switched
104
off. The momentum continued two months later when an antinuclear
demonstration amassed over 170,000 people, making it the largest
105
The Fukushima NPP disaster
demonstration in national history.
refocused Japan’s energy portfolio and policies, placing an importance on
immediate economic security over long-term safety and environmental
106
concerns.
A. Energy Portfolio and Policies
1.

Domestic Power Production

Prior to the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan had planned to boost
nuclear power production to more than fifty percent of its electricity by
107
2030 from around thirty percent, partly to fight climate change. The
need for power is high because Japan is the third largest overall energy
108
consumer globally, behind China and the United States. Nevertheless,
after the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan has had to reduce the volume
of power consumed nationally as it drastically shifts its energy portfolio
109
in response to pressure from the public to focus on renewable energy.
Following the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan progressively shut
down all of its nuclear power plants despite most of its fifty-plus nuclear

101. Davies, supra note 5, at 1956.
102. Olga Belogolova, Why Japan Can’t Quit Nuclear Power, Yahoo News: Nat’l J. (Feb. 15,
2013, 9:30 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/why-japan-cant-quit-nuclear-power-143033191--politics.html.
103. Id.
104. Thousands March as Japan Switches Off Nuclear Power, Asahi Shimbun: Asia & Japan
Watch (Mar. 6, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201205060016.
105. Belogolova, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. See Agency for Nat. Res. & Energy, Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus. of Japan, The
Strategic Energy Plan of Japan (2014), http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/
pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf.
108. Semmler, supra note 21, at 3; see also Hiroko Tabuchi, Quake in Japan Causes Costly Shift to
Fossil Fuels, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2011, at B2 (“Japan, the world’s third-largest user of electricity
behind China and the United States . . . .”).
109. Tabuchi, supra note 108.
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power plants being operable. As a result, Japan has had to rely on
111
“coal, oil, and liquefied natural gas for nearly 90% of its power needs.”
In the wake of the Fukushima NPP disaster, while nuclear energy
dropped 100%, gas and oil production increased 10% and 53%
112
respectively. Finally, on April 11, 2014, the Japanese government agreed
113
on a single strategic energy plan.
The 2014 Strategic Energy Plan includes four basic principles,
114
including safety and energy security. The first confirms the “3E + S”
thrust of Japanese energy policy, which emphasizes “Energy Security”
while striving for greater “Economic Efficiency” and harmony with the
115
“Environment,” with “Safety” as a basic premise. The second principle
is “building a multilayered and diversified flexible energy supply-and116
demand structure.” What these principles amount to in policy terms is
a complete overhaul of the status quo in Japan’s energy supply system.
More specifically, the energy reform redefines the roles of fossil fuels,
nuclear power, and renewable energy in Japan’s domestic energy
portfolio. While the direction of the domestic energy portfolio is clear,
there remain policy obstacles in executing such a reactionary and drastic
change to the well-developed energy portfolio that existed prior to the
Fukushima NPP disaster.
There are two main policies that arose out of the Fukushima NPP
disaster: the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund Act (“Fund
Act”) and the contagion effects on undamaged energy companies. Five
months after the Fukushima NPP disaster, the Fund Act was adopted to
provide expeditious and appropriate compensation for nuclear damage,
and ensure a stable supply of electricity and the smooth and
117
uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors. The Fund Act adopted a

110. See Nuclear Power in Japan, World Nuclear Ass’n, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Japan/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2015).
111. See Semmler, supra note 21, at 6–7; see also Hisashi Hattori, Analysis: Japan’s Energy Policy
Has Been Governed by Series of Shocks, Asahi Shimbun (May 5, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/
article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201205050050; Mari Iwata & Henry Hoenig, Japan Struggles to Find
Balanced Energy Strategy, Wall St. J. (May 13, 2015, 11:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
japan-struggles-to-find-balanced-energy-strategy-1431545581; Justin McCurry, Japan’s New Prime
Minister Promises Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Cuts, Guardian (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2009/sep/07/japan-greenhouse-gas-cuts.
112. Japan generated 1059 terawatt-hours (“TWh”) gross, 338 TWh from coal, 408 TWh from gas
(up from 300 TWh in 2010), 9 TWh from nuclear (cf 288 TWh in 2010), 161 TWh from oil (up from 94
TWh in 2010), and 84 TWh from hydro. See Japan: International Energy Data and Analysis, supra note 9.
113. See Cabinet Decision on the New Strategic Energy Plan, Agency for Nat. Res. & Energy,
Ministry of Econ., Trade & Indus. of Japan, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2014/0411_02.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Agency for Nat. Res. & Energy, supra note 107, at 18.
117. See generally Serita & Xu, supra note 22 (examining Japanese market activity in the period
after the NPP disaster and passage of the Fund Act). The Fund Act was adopted by the Cabinet on
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financial assistance scheme to insulate energy companies from
bankruptcy and dissolution when it is found liable for particular acts so
egregious that a resulting judgment would cause the energy company to
118
become insolvent. The Fund Act was particularly enacted to serve the
owner and operator of the Fukushima NPP, the Tokyo Electric Power
Company (“TEPCO”), in anticipation of its liability for the Fukushima
119
NPP disaster. Essentially, use of the Act converts commercial electric
power companies into state-owned enterprises, allowing consumers to
pay the electricity bill and pay for losses of monopolistic electric power
120
companies upon proof of liability. For example, when TEPCO was
found negligent in its maintenance and operation of the Fukushima NPP,
and therefore liable for the Fukushima NPP disaster, recovery for losses
to victims from TEPCO would have been enormous. Because TEPCO
would owe money and penalties in excess of its income stream, TEPCO
would have been forced into bankruptcy and closure, resulting in loss of
electrical power, amongst other energy sources, to all consumers in its
region. In other words, judgment owed by TEPCO would hurt the public
and therefore be counterintuitive to its purpose. To avoid insolvency and
any social, political, and economic ramifications that insolvency might
have created, the Fund Act was triggered and enabled recovery owed by
TEPCO to be shifted to the Japanese government and ultimately the
121
Japanese public at large. Therefore, the Fund Act allowed TEPCO to
continue to operate and victims to be made whole.
The Fund Act limits energy companies’ liability when the energy
company operates to effectuate Japan’s climate laws. The Fund Act is
just one demonstration of how the Japanese government has drastically
changed its law and policy on climate law. However, it remains unclear
how the Fund Act will help Japan’s domestic energy portfolio and, in
turn, whether it will help Japan meet its Kyoto Protocol obligations given
that absent the Fund Act, undamaged power companies would be
entitled to keep their respective economic gains. However, under the
Fund Act terms, these segmented regional monopolistic companies must
122
use their profits to assist TEPCO pay its judgment. As a result, the
Fukushima NPP disaster has indeed created detrimental contagion
effects to undamaged power companies.
The second policy obstacle with the new domestic energy portfolio
is concerned with significant economic changes experienced by energy

June 14, 2011, revised and passed by special committee of the House on July 25, 201,1 and passed by
the Diet on August 3, 2011. Id. at 28.
118. See Serita & Xu, supra note 22.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 29.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 28–29.
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companies that were not damaged or directly affected by the Fukushima
NPP disaster. The Fukushima NPP disaster adversely affected TEPCO
directly and contagion effects were felt by non-TEPCO companies that
did not experience damage, but nevertheless, became subject to sweeping
energy portfolio and policy changes domestically. Like the United States,
the Japanese government does not own or operate domestic energy
production; rather, a collective of ten local power companies control the
domestic energy market, and these nongovernmental companies rarely
123
compete with marginalized fringe firms that dare to emerge.
Furthermore, similar to how the energy market operates in the United
States, these monopolies generate, transmit, and distribute electricity
124
Therefore, each power
exclusively to their segregated regions.
company has a duty and responsibility to provide energy to any and all
125
customers in that area. In other words, each power company cannot
and does not operate beyond its established borders, and therefore
effects from Fukushima NPP disaster did not directly spread to other
energy industries or companies due in large part to the fact that
segmented regional monopolistic companies produce domestic energy.
Nevertheless, energy companies nationally have transformed Japan’s
energy portfolio through technology and other economic efforts to create
126
a low-carbon, nuclear free society.
First, general electric utilities have had to forego traditional means
of electricity generation and, in the immediate aftermath of the disaster,
experienced stoppages imposed on them by the government due to no
culpable behavior or action of their own. Utilities companies taking issue
with this is valid given that the six-month temporary stoppage in the
summer of 2012 cost eight of the ten power utilities $8.5 billion because
127
they had to buy more oil and gas to replace idle nuclear reactors. Such

123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 8–9. In the United States,
the pact that utilities have made in exchange for an exclusive service territory is to provide
energy to any and all customers in that area. The assumption is that the level of energy
demand in the territory is irrelevant because the supply the utility provides will be abundant
and secure. The law compels utilities to abide by energy policy’s overarching objectives—
including to assure abundant power supplies.
Davies, supra note 5, at 1968.
125. See Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 8–9 As courts have repeatedly held,
[T]he term ‘public utility’ implies a public use, carrying with it the duty to serve the public
and treat all persons alike, without discrimination, and it precludes the idea of service which
is private in its nature, whether for the benefit and advantage of a few or of many . . . .
Id.
126. Semmler, supra note 21, at 29; Yoshifumi Nakashima, Launch of a New Climate Change
Campaign, “Fun to Share”, Japan Env’t Q. (June 2014), http://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/jeq/issue/vol06/
feature.html.
127. See Belogolova, supra note 102.
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costs then passed on to the consumers who experienced an energy bill
increase of 8.5% despite Japan’s energy costs already being among the
128
highest in the world due to the imposed stoppages. Moreover, when the
Japanese government was considering a nuclear phase out, one study
found that such a take-it-or-leave-it stance would cost consumers $10
129
billion (or $115 per household) and businesses $22 billion. The fallout
would have cost some 420,000 on-site jobs, leading to an approximately
$11 billion annual decline in corporate tax revenue, and thereby
escalating the already massive debt problem faced by the world’s third
130
largest economy. Such economic instability is not desired, especially
amongst the private energy industry that would get the brunt of the
vicious cycle. According to the chairman of Sumitomo Chemical and
head of Japan’s largest business lobby, Japanese energy companies
would have to “start to move overseas” if prolonged energy shortages
are forecasted, or if national policy effects from the post-Fukushima NPP
131
disaster prove to be too detrimental.
The sudden and heavy retreat from nuclear power to fossil fuels has
caused a direct increase in CO2 emissions by 1.4%, in direct opposition to
132
Japan’s Kyoto Protocol reduction target. Accordingly, in August 2015,
Prime Minister Abe took a decisive step toward resurrecting the nuclear
power industry and ending a de facto freeze on the use of nuclear power
133
by restarting a reactor at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant. Other
134
reactors might restart too. Still, questions arise as to whether Japan will
also comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The Japanese government struggles
to agree on both a coherent long-term domestic energy portfolio and the
country’s role in the international energy market.
2.

International Power Production

Japan lacks minerals and energy domestically, and, as a result of this
geographic and commodity vulnerability, Japan has a substantial
international energy portfolio given that it “needs to import about 84%
135
of its energy requirements.” To illustrate, prior to the Fukushima NPP
136
disaster, Japan was the third largest producer of nuclear energy and
137
imported ninety-three percent of its energy supply. To meet its needs,

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Tabuchi, supra note 108.
132. Mari Iwata, Japan CO2 Emissions Worst on Record, Wall St. J. (Nov. 17, 2014, 5:50 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/11/17/japan-co2-emissions-worst-on-record/.
133. Martin, supra note 16.
134. Id.
135. Nuclear Power in Japan, supra note 110.
136. Belogolova, supra note 102.
137. Semmler, supra note 21, at 3.
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Japan structured its international energy dealings so that it receives a
138
supply of fossil fuels cheaply from other countries. However, in the wake
of the Fukushima NPP disaster, the Japanese government has adopted an
energy import model.
Under an energy import model, utility companies continue to
import natural gas to generate power while the Japanese government
develops energy production sources abroad. For example, utility companies
import eighty percent of Japan’s oil and twenty percent of its natural gas
139
from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the
Japanese government has adopted an energy import model akin to South
140
Korea, Russia, and France. Those countries have successfully contracted
with emerging and developing countries to build, own, and operate power
141
plants for energy export to their respective countries. Pertinent here,
Japan continues to seek contracts with countries such as Malaysia, India,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, and Jordan to develop and export energy for
142
consumption in Japan. Japan continues to adhere to its energy import
model despite the scarcity of countries willing to risk international
143
sanctions as they increase their CO2 emissions for Japan.
Moreover, the energy import model has aggregated Japan’s trade
144
deficit, placing an extra burden on the national economy. In fact,
energy imports accounted for fifty-five percent of Japan’s $169 billion
145
trade deficit from 2011 through 2013. To alleviate the financial burden,
Japan created its first domestic carbon tax, the Tax for Climate Change
146
Mitigation, which began to be enforced in 2012. This carbon tax
spreads the burden of fossil fuel use widely and thinly in an effort to
leverage economic incentives through taxation and strengthen energy-

138. Id. at 5.
139. See Abe Seeks to Allow SDF Minesweeping in Strait of Hormuz, Citing Economic, Energy
Risk, Asahi Shimbun (Feb. 17, 2015), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201502170036.
140. See Japan’s Nuclear Power Policy at a Crossroads, Asahi Shimbun (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201103162974.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Yuriy Humber & Chikako Mogi, Japan’s Idled Reactors, Weak Yen Drive Deficit on Energy,
Bloomberg Bus. (Sept. 18, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-18/japans-idled-reactors-weak-yen-drive-deficit-on-energy.
145. Id. (“With renewable energy not widespread enough to fill the gap, utilities and other
companies have had to import natural gas to generate power. From 2011 through 2013, Japan’s trade
balance worsened by a cumulative 18.1 trillion yen ($169 billion), estimates Taro Saito, director of
economic research at the NLI Research Institute in Tokyo. Of that amount, 10 trillion yen, or 55%,
came from energy imports. As a result, Japan’s trade balance has been in the red every month since
June 2012 . . . . As a result of the high cost of imported fuel, Japan’s current account registered a $3.9
billion monthly deficit in June. If such deficits persist, downward pressure on the yen could build.”).
146. Ministry of the Env’t, Details on the Carbon Tax (Tax for Climate Change Mitigation),
http://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/tax/env-tax/20121001a_dct.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
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related CO2 emissions control measures. Still, questions arise as to
whether an energy import model and carbon tax program are long-term
solutions to help Japan comply with the Kyoto Protocol.
B. Compliance Goals
Despite the Fukushima NPP disaster, Japan has remained committed
to complying with its goal of reducing CO2 emissions to seven percent
below 1990 levels. To do this, Japan established domestic compliance
mechanisms, adopted Germany’s post-Fukushima NPP disaster energy
model, and created a regulatory authority to oversee its domestic nuclear
power industry.
1. Domestic Compliance Mechanisms
In addition to using the carbon trading mechanisms to meet its CO2
emissions targets, Japan has adopted two domestic market-based
148
policies, a cap-and-trade program and a limited feed-in tariff. A cap149
and-trade policy is based on quantity. Instead of setting a price on each
unit of pollution, the Ministry of Environment for Japan determines a
150
total quantity of pollution (“cap”) allowed per participant. Similar to
the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon trading system, these domestic CO2
emissions allowances are bought and sold between companies based on
151
their needs. Moreover, the government has the authority to issue
penalties (or other appropriate actions) to companies who fail to
152
purchase credits when they exceed their allocation. The cap-and-trade
system serves to make renewables cost competitive with fossil fuels and
153
reduce CO2 emissions. However, Japan has not implemented a cap-and
154
trade-policy nationally. For example, Tokyo, Japan’s largest CO2 emitter

147. Id.
148. Japan:
Carbon
Pricing
Experience,
Partnership
for
Mkt.
Readiness,
https://www.thepmr.org/country/japan-0 (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Office of Mkt. Mechanisms,
Ministry of the Env’t of Japan, Consideration of Emissions Trading Scheme in Japan 3, 5 (Apr.
2012), https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech/scheme-emissions_trading.pdf; Int’l Emissions
Trading Ass’n, Japan: The World’s Carbon Markets: A Case Study Guide to Emissions Trading 2
(Sept. 2013), http://www.ieta.org/assets/Reports/EmissionsTradingAroundTheWorld/edf_ieta_japan_
case_study_september_2013.pdf.
149. See James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 87, 122–23
(2014).
150. Id.; Ministry of the Env’t of Japan, Scheme Options for Japanese Emissions Trading Scheme
Based on Cap and Trade System 3 (Sept. 2010), https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/ets/mkt_mech/schemeoptions100910.pdf.
151. Id. at 10.
152. Id. at 8, 21.
153. Semmler, supra note 21, at 25.
154. Id. at 15–16, n.28 (“Cap-and-trade is a system for the reduction of carbon emissions. A
governmental body will set a cap on the amount of a pollutant which may be emitted overall. Firms
are then forced to buy permits equivalent to their CO2 emissions. By capping the overall number of
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and the world’s most populated metropolis, has its own cap-and-trade
155
policy. Despite having had “remarkable reductions,” Tokyo’s cap-andtrade policy remains limited geographically and has not been adopted
156
nationally. Accordingly, domestic mechanisms to reduce CO2 emissions
remain limited, and as a result, Japan might not be able to attain its
Kyoto Protocol obligations.
Absent a cap-and-trade policy, the Japanese government has
157
established a limited feed-in tariff. The tariff is limited because the
policy applies only to “surplus electricity generated through solar PV
158
from residential, non-business owners.” Moreover, the tariff requires
electronic power suppliers to procure the whole renewable electricity at a
fixed price, and each supplier collects surcharges from electricity users to
159
cover the costs. This domestic mechanism has reduced negative
externalities from fossil fuels and reduced amounts of fossil fuel and
uranium imports, allowing the feed-in tariff to “pay for itself within a
160
year.” The feed-in tariff has been Japan’s most effective policy tool for
161
diffusing solar energy. As a result, the feed-in tariff is a more popular
domestic mechanism than a national cap-and-trade policy because the
tariff option imposes more economic flexibility should Japan not be able
162
to comply with the Kyoto Protocol.
2. Modeling a New Energy Portfolio After Germany
A year before the Fukushima NPP disaster, Germany had brokered
a deal to extend the lives of its seventeen active nuclear power plants by
163
twelve years and was expanding its renewable energy market. For
example, Germany was quickly expanding its solar capacity given that its
solar resources were fourteen percent less than Japan’s solar resources at

permits and gradually reducing them, policy makers have a mechanism of putting a price on the social
cost of carbon, as well as reducing a country’s emissions.”).
155. Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t, Tokyo Climate Change Strategy: Progress Report and
Future Vision (Mar. 31, 2010), https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/tokyo_climate_
change_strategy_progress_report_03312010.pdf; Bureau of the Env’t, Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t,
Tokyo Cap-and-Trade Program: Japan’s First Mandatory Emissions Trading Scheme (Mar. 2010),
https://www.kankyo.metro.tokyo.jp/en/attachement/Tokyo-cap_and_trade_program-march_2010_TMG.pdf;
Masahiro Kimura, Tokyo Metropolitan Gov’t-Env’t, Tokyo: Cap and Trade Program: Lessons
Learned (June 10, 2010), https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/07_tokyo_masahiro_kimura.pdf.
156. Kimura, supra note 155, at 2.
157. Japan: Carbon Pricing Experience, supra note 148.
158. Semmler, supra note 21, at 25.
159. Japan: Carbon Pricing Experience, supra note 148.
160. Semmler, supra note 21, at 26.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id. at 26 (“Mainly driven by former prime minister Naota Kan and Softbank’s CEO
Masayoshi Son, Japan’s feed-in tariff is to be extended to geothermal, wind, small hydro and biogas in
mid 2012.”).
163. Davies, supra note 5, at 1948.
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164

the time. Germany promoted itself as an economic and environmental
165
leader. However, the Fukushima NPP disaster ignited antinuclear
sentiment in Germany to all-time highs, prompting Germany to
166
immediately reverse its nuclear plans. To do this, Germany announced
that it would shut down all seven nuclear power plants constructed prior
167
to 1980 with a desire to phase out all reactors by 2017. In reality,
Germany began “phas[ing] out its remaining ten reactors, so that after
168
2022 no nuclear power plant would operate in Germany.” The revised
policy raised concerns about additional greenhouse gas emissions;
however, those concerns were quickly subdued when Germany approved
169
licenses for expanding its renewable energy production. Now, Germany’s
renewable, hydro, and nuclear energy comprises twenty percent of its
energy portfolio, which is nearly triple Japan’s seven percent and double
170
China’s nine percent. More importantly, Germany has met its energy
demand, albeit with imported power from France and the Czech
171
Republic, both heavy users of nuclear power. Additionally, there has
been a wealth transfer from nuclear energy companies to renewable
172
energy companies in Germany. Germany’s revised energy model has
been hailed as an example of how a country can reduce its use of nuclear
173
power and its emissions of greenhouse gases at the same time.
Given that success, Japan aims to mirror the energy model
developed by Germany to make its renewable energy twenty percent to
174
twenty-two percent of its energy portfolio by 2030. In 2011, then-Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda emphasized to the business community that
renewable, not nuclear, power was the future when he pledged to reduce
Japan’s reliance on nuclear power over time by closing all fifty of the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Semmler, supra note 21, at 16.
Davies, supra note 5, at 1948.
Id. at 1938–49.
Young-Doo Wang et al., supra note 99.
Davies, supra note 5, at 1949.

The German decision was met with great domestic fanfare. Whereas a poll showed fifty-six
percent of Germans opposing the extension of nuclear plants’ lives in 2010, the phaseout-by2022 proposal rushed through the German legislature: eighty-five percent of parliamentarians
supported the move, and the vote in the lower house was an overwhelming 513–79.
Id. at 1950.
169. Young-Doo Wang et al., supra note 99, at 12–13; Davies, supra note 5, at 1963.
170. Semmler, supra note 21, at 8.
171. Davies, supra note 5, at 1951.
172. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 2–3.
173. Malcolm Foster, Japan’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Efforts Eroded by Fukushima Nuclear
Disaster, Huffington Post Green (July 4, 2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/04/
japan-greenhouse-gas-emissions_n_1476580.html.
174. The Kyushu Electric Power Company restarted its Sendai 1 reactor on August 11, 2015 and its
Sendai 2 reactor on October 15, 2015. Japan Nuclear Update, Nuclear Energy Inst.,
http://www.nei.org/News-Media/News/Japan-Nuclear-Update (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
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country’s functioning reactors by around 2040.
However, unlike
Germany, Japan cannot buy electricity from neighboring countries
during periods of shortfalls or blackouts because Japan does not share
176
power grids with any other country. Therefore, Japan’s use of Germany’s
energy model is limited and might not attain the same success.
3. Creation of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority
To comply with the Kyoto Protocol, Japan’s Ministry of the
Environment and the Ministry of the Economy, Trade, and Industry
created the Nuclear Regulation Authority (“NRA”) in September
177
2012. The NRA is an “external organization of the Ministry of the
Environment” responsible for overseeing the domestic nuclear power
178
industry. This new agency replaced a patchwork of bureaucrats who
controlled the industry before the Fukushima NPP disaster and who
179
were moving glacially to restart the idled reactors. So far, the NRA has
only deemed one of forty-eight reactors ready, though forty-three
180
reactors are operable and potentially able to restart. Twenty-four of
181
these reactors are in the process of restart approvals. Additionally, the
NRA has established new post-Fukushima NPP disaster technical
182
standards for nuclear reactors. For example, the NRA has required
upgrades of the remaining reactors to new industry standards even
though it might cost more than $12 billion, a sum the utilities companies
183
have already pledged.
III. Proposal
In leading to the shutdown of all nuclear power plants from 2011 to
2013, the Fukushima NPP disaster has exacerbated and created a new
barrier to compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Compared to other energy
sources, nuclear energy produces up to thirty-six percent less CO2
184
emissions. In fact, nuclear power is capable of producing huge amounts of

175. Id.; Justin McCurry, Japan’s New Prime Minister Promises Ambitious Greenhouse Gas Cuts,
Guardian (Sept. 7, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/sep/07/japan-greenhousegas-cuts.
176. Foster, supra note 173.
177. Nuclear Regulation Auth., Japan, Nuclear Regulation for People and the
Environment 3, https://www.nsr.go.jp/english/e_nra/nsr_leaflet_English.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
178. Id.
179. Humber & Mogi, supra note 144, at 1.
180. Id.
181. See Japan Nuclear Update, supra note 174.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Nuclear power emits 73 million tonnes of CO2 to generate 2518 TWh of electricity. To
generate the same amount of electricity, natural gas would emit 1256 CO2, oil would emit 1846 CO2,
coal would emit 2236 CO2, and lignite would emit 2654 CO2. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Avoided
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185

energy with little or no carbon emissions. This is because the processes
of running a nuclear power plant generate no CO2, but some CO2
emissions arise from the construction of the plant, the mining of the
uranium, the enrichment of the uranium, its conversion into nuclear fuel,
186
its final disposal, and the final plant decommissioning. For that reason,
nuclear power is the best option to effectuate and comply with Japan’s
Kyoto Protocol reduced CO2 emissions target.
If Japan reverts its plan to be antinuclear, Japan will have a much
tougher time reducing emissions and meeting its reduced CO2 emissions
target. According to one study, “[w]ithout nuclear power, Japan is
projected to produce an additional 180 million [to] 210 million tons of
emissions” in one fiscal year as “compared to the base year of 1990, when
187
emissions totaled 1.261 billion tons.” This study is proof that a nuclear
phase out would aggravate Japan’s international energy portfolio by
188
placing a greater importance on the import of fuel. Moreover, Japan’s
domestic energy portfolio will be compromised.
With virtually no alternate source of energy that is as plentiful and
cheap as nuclear power, Japan is economically, historically, and
189
culturally handcuffed to nuclear power. Former industry minister and
current economic and fiscal policy minister Kaoru Yosano has stated that
the “use of nuclear power [is] unavoidable to support the country’s
190
economy and its people’s livelihoods.” In light of this dependence,
Japan continues to spend sixty-four percent of its 500 billion yen energy
191
research and development budget on nuclear energy. Moreover, the
government provides huge subsidies to power companies in the nuclear
192
industry. In other words, the Japanese government has assumed the

Through Use of Nuclear Energy, World Nuclear Ass’n, http://www.world-nuclear.org/NuclearBasics/Greenhouse-gas-emissions-avoided/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
185. Richard B. Alley et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for
Policymakers: A Report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.
186. Life-Cycle Emissions Analyses, Nuclear Energy Inst., http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/
Protecting-the-Environment/Life-Cycle-Emissions-Analyses (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
187. Foster, supra note 173.
188. Belogolova, supra note 102.
189. Id.
190. Japan’s Nuclear Power Policy at a Crossroads, supra note 140.
191. Belogolova, supra note 102; see also Hideyuki Ban, Cost of Nuclear Power in Japan, Citizens
Nuclear Info. Ctr., http://www.cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit113/nit113articles/nit113cost.html (last
visited Feb. 8, 2016) (“The Japanese government spends more than any other government on energy
research and development. Nuclear energy receives 64% of this, by far the greatest portion. By
comparison, only 8% is spent on renewable energy, while 12% is spent on energy efficiency etc . . .
The government’s nuclear energy budget hovers around 500 billion yen ($4.5b). Private R&D
investment (27 billion yen ($247m) in 2003) is well below 10% of government spending on nuclear
energy, so clearly the government has provided huge subsidies to the nuclear industry. Without these
subsidies, the industry wouldn’t have survived.”).
192. Belogolova, supra note 102; Ban, supra note 191.
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cost of power plant risks and will not allow energy companies to become
193
insolvent. As a result, Japan has institutionalized corporate power
plant initiatives ahead of government policy in an effort to privatize
industry profits and socialize industry losses, and any reversal of this
194
relationship would upset domestic energy policies.
While one nuclear power plant has restarted in August 2015,
whether and when all nuclear power plants will come back online, and
what that implies for Japan’s long-term emissions trajectory is still to be
195
determined. Japan should be allowed to continue using CO2 emitting
power (and to withdraw from the Protocol) because it cannot turn to rely
on nuclear power in light of shutdowns and political pushes toward
nuclear reduction.
A. Japan Will Fail to Comply with the Kyoto Protocol
Japan has not and cannot reduce its CO2 emissions to 6% below its
1990 level as a result of energy portfolio changes that occurred due to the
Fukushima NPP disaster. A couple of years before the Fukushima NPP
disaster, the Japanese government proclaimed it was “on target to cut
greenhouse gas emissions by an estimated average of 8% below 1990
levels, . . . meaning it [would] meet its commitments under the Kyoto
196
Protocol.” At the same time, some reports expressed doubt when they
clarified that Japan could “still barely meet its commitment under the
Kyoto Protocol to reduce emissions during the five-year period through
197
2012 by an average of [6%] from 1990 levels.” For the reasons stated
earlier, the Fukushima NPP disaster thwarted all projections and realities
for Japan to meet its reduced CO2 emissions targets. More recently, the
Japanese government has admitted that it will produce, instead of
198
reduce, more CO2 emissions than it did in 1990.
According to the Japanese government’s calculations, Japan will
produce 15% to 16% more CO2 emissions in 2020 than it did in 1990,
reflecting a rise in non-nuclear power after the progressive and indefinite
199
closure of all nuclear plants. So far, Japan is on track to meet this
horrifying projection. In 2013, Japan’s CO2 emissions rose 10.8% above
its 1990 levels, making 2013 Japan’s second highest emissions of CO2 on
193. Semmler, supra note 21, at 22.
194. Id. at 22, 29.
195. Martin, supra note 16.
196. Japan on Track to Meet Kyoto Carbon Emission Target, Climate Group (Oct. 10, 2012),
http://www.theclimategroup.org/what-we-do/news-and-blogs/japan-on-track-to-meet-kyoto-carbon-emissiontarget; see also McCurry, supra note 175 (citing “8% cut unveiled by the outgoing government in June,
at a UN meeting on climate change in New York this month”).
197. Foster, supra note 173.
198. This projection also raises doubts about whether Japan will able to meet its 2009 Copenhagen
pledge to slash emissions by twenty-five percent from 1990 levels by 2020. Id.
199. Id.
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record. Moreover, “[p]reliminary data in December had shown the
201
emissions were a record high in . . . 2014.” Accordingly, with a definitive
plan to bring nuclear power back into Japan’s domestic energy portfolio,
Japan has and will continue to leave a lasting carbon footprint in the
wake of the Fukushima NPP disaster, and therefore fail to meet its
reduced CO2 emissions target.
B. Japan Should Be Excused from Kyoto Protocol Obligations
This Note argues that the Fukushima NPP disaster was an event of
force majeure. Force majeure is a legal principle, provided for either by
contract or imposed on parties by law or the courts. As stated earlier, this
principle excuses, or partially excuses, one or both parties to a contract
202
from performing contractual obligations in certain specified circumstances.
Rather than excuse a party that could have avoided its failure to perform
through commercially reasonable means, force majeure excuses a party
from performance obligations or liability if some unforeseen event beyond
the control of that party prevents it from performing its contractual
203
obligations. Aligned with this latter definition, the Kyoto Protocol
states that a “Force Majeure Event” means “any event beyond the
reasonable control of the person affected including, without limitation,
labor dispute, act of God, war, act or circumstance of terrorism, riot, civil
commotion, malicious damage, accident, breakdown of essential computer
software, hardware or system failure, fire, flood and/or storm and other
unforeseen circumstances materially and adversely affecting the
204
performance” of the country. When a force majeure event causes
noncompliance, “for so long as the circumstances continue, [the country]
shall be relieved of its obligations under the Terms and Conditions which
it has been prevented from fulfilling as a result of that Force Majeure
205
Event without liability.” Of course, the obliged country must still “take
all reasonable and practical steps to minimize any loss and/or disruption
206
resulting from any such Force Majeure Event.” The impact of an “act
of God” depends on the size and composition of the affected party, and
can lead to complete noncompliance, thereby excusing a party from its
207
obligations.
200. Osamu Tsukimori, Japan Sets 26 Percent Cut in Greenhouse Gas Emissions as Target, Reuters
(July 17, 2015, 12:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/17/us-japan-carbon-idUSKCN0
PR0A220150717.
201. Osamu Tsukimori, Japan’s CO2 Emissions Hit Second-Highest on Record, Reuters (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/14/us-carbon-japan-idUSKBN0N50BJ20150414.
202. Force Majeure Clause, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
203. See id.
204. UNFCCC Lima Report, supra note 61, at 6.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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Here, force majeure could be applied to excuse Japan, a party to the
Kyoto Protocol ratified in 2002, from its CO2 emissions reduction
requirements in light of the Fukushima NPP disaster. Specifically, this
Note argues that the earthquake and tsunami were “acts of God,” as
contemplated by force majeure; that those “acts of God” led to the
destruction of the Fukushima NPP and the dismantling of nuclear power
in Japan; that these events were unforeseen and beyond the control of
Japan; and that the events will prevent Japan from performing its Kyoto
208
Protocol obligations.
C. Japan Can Successfully Argue Force Majeure
In order to evoke force majeure, a party must be excused by the
supervising party when four factors have been met: (1) adequate notice
of the event has been given; (2) performance is not otherwise possible;
(3) the duration of time of the force majeure events renders performance
impossible or insurmountable such that one or both of the contracting
parties might find performance unsatisfactory and prefer some alternative
arrangement; and (4) allocation of performance is not fair and not
209
reasonable.
Here, adequate notice has, arguably, sufficiently been given.
Because the Fukushima NPP disaster occurred just one year prior to the
Kyoto Protocol target deadline and the Fukushima NPP disaster was
well-publicized throughout the world, then the UNFCCC was given
sufficient notice of the Fukushima NPP. In the alternative, Japan can and
should now evoke force majeure to the UNFCCC so as to give explicit
notice of the economic, environmental, and political consequences the
Fukushima NPP disaster created that has and will continue to cause
Japan to not comply with its Kyoto Protocol obligations. Although it may
be argued that Japan is exploiting the Fukushima NPP disaster to avoid
unattainable Kyoto Protocol obligation, Japan would have legal grounds
to claim force majeure.
Second, performance is not otherwise possible for Japan. Currently,
all but one of the forty-eight reactors have been shut down since the
Fukushima NPP disasterforty-three reactors are operable and
potentially able to restart, and twenty-four of these are in the process of
210
restart approvals. While Prime Minister Abe champions for nuclear
power plants, various district courts in Japan have blocked his efforts by
upholding an injunction banning the restart of local nuclear reactors.
Such was the case in Fukui where the court “dismissed” a “motion for a
stay on an earlier decision to temporarily bar the restart of the No. 3 and

208. Id.
209. UCC § 2-615 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2012).
210. Japan Nuclear Update, supra note 174.
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211

No. 4 reactors at plant in Takahama.” The court reasoned that nuclear
212
power plants were not safe to reopen at that time. Nuclear power
plants might be safe to reopen once the government has fully developed
an energy portfolio with sufficient safeguards. To date, the 2014 Strategic
213
Energy Plan addresses such concerns, but lacks public support.
Moreover, Japan lacks minerals and energy domestically to serve as
alternatives. As a result of this geographic and commodity vulnerability,
Japan is dependent on its substantial international energy portfolio that
“imports about 84% of its energy requirements” absent its ability to
214
produce nuclear energy domestically. Simply put, performance is not
otherwise possible for Japan.
Third, there is great uncertainty and disagreement within the
Japanese government as to how long the period of nuclear power plant
suspension should and will be. Given the previously discussed barriers to
compliance, the delay in performance resulting from the Fukushima NPP
disaster and subsequent nuclear power shut downs has proven to be
quite lengthy and indefinite. Accordingly, the short- and long-term
consequences are still being realized. Therefore, such a drawn out force
majeure event should render Japan’s performance impossible or
insurmountable, and thus Japan should be excused under force majeure.
In accordance with the enforcement branch’s compliance mechanism,
Japan might be able to cover its deficit in the second commitment period
215
ending in 2020. However, Japan might not be able to fully comply with
that mechanism because it also requires Japan to reduce its CO2
emissions another 30% of that deficit, in addition to whatever its
216
commitment would be for that period. In total, Japan would have to
217
reduce its CO2 emissions to 32.8% below 1990 levels by 2020. Such an
allocation of performance is not fair and reasonable because Japan might
be unable to fairly and reasonably allocate its carbon credits to meet its
Kyoto Protocol targets by 2020. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Japan can
use three mechanisms that allow it and private companies to buy,
generate, or trade emissions credits. These credits then count toward
211. Japan Court Upholds Nuclear Power Plant Injunction, PHYS.org (May 19, 2015),
http://phys.org/news/2015-05-japan-court-nuclear-power-injunction.html.
212. Id.
213. Cabinet Decision on the New Strategic Energy Plan, supra note 113.
214. Nuclear Power in Japan, supra note 110.
215. Legal Response Initiative, Kyoto Compliance Mechanism ¶ 5 (July 19, 2010),
http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BP12E-Briefing-Paper-Kyoto-Compliance
-Mechanism-19-July-2010.pdf.
216. Id.
217. Initially, Japan was obliged to reduce their CO2 emission levels to 6% of their 1990 levels.
Adding 30% of 6% (1.8%), totals 7.8%. Then, because in 2010 Japan imposed upon themselves a 25%
reduction target for 2020, Japan’s total CO2 emission target is 32.8% below 1990 levels, in accordance
with the enforcement branch’s deferred- compliance mechanism. Hiroko Tabuci, Quake in Japan
Causes Costly Shift to Fossil Fuels, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 2011, at B2.
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Japan’s reduction target. While normally this option would be exercised,
Japan was close to meeting its target in 2010 until the Fukushima NPP
disaster occurred just one year prior to the Kyoto target deadline.
Accordingly, Japan’s government appropriately focused its energy
toward the safety of its people and on addressing the issues that had led
to the Fukushima NPP disaster, rather than the consequences of missing
its Kyoto targets. Therefore, it would not have been fair or reasonable
for the Japanese government to spend time, energy, and resources on
obtaining emissions credits under the various mechanisms. Moreover, it
is neither industry custom nor the practice of the government to put
environmental issues before human lives and reacting to a nuclear power
plant disaster. Accordingly, the Fukushima NPP disaster was a legitimate
reason for Japan to allocate its efforts away from meeting its Kyoto
targets. Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is not and cannot be a
priority of the Japanese government following the Fukushima NPP
disaster.
One inevitable consequence of the Fukushima NPP disaster not
being a priority of the Japanese government is that it will not comply
with the Kyoto Protocol. Japan has focused on diversifying its energy
portfolio to safely meet current power needs rather than addressing its
Kyoto targets. While this might seem like an act of intentional
noncompliance, this Note argues that such an act is of inadvertence. No
behavior of Japan contributed to the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear
power plant destruction that simultaneously occurred. In fact, but for the
Fukushima NPP disaster, the Japanese government and TEPCO would
have honored various supply agreements, purchase orders, joint venture
agreements, and many other contractual relationships it had with
consumers, suppliers, and employees. Now, Japan is simply not able to
do so. By evoking force majeure to free itself from Kyoto Protocol
obligations, Japan might also free itself from like treaties and agreements
that imposed similar obligations that it is no longer able to comply with
due to the Fukushima NPP disaster. In doing so, Japan could avoid any
and all penalties for noncompliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Such a
decision is valid under Article 27(2) of the Kyoto Protocol, which permits
countries to withdraw within “one year from the date of . . . notification
218
of withdrawal.”

218. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 27; see also Status of Ratification of Kyoto Protocol,
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
background/items/6603.php (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
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Conclusion
Japan’s carbon emissions reduction targets established by the Kyoto
Protocol have been frustrated by the unanticipated events of the
Fukushima NPP disaster. As no country has ever experienced an
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear power plant disaster collectively on one
219
single day, the events constitute unforeseen “acts of God” of a magnitude
sufficient to excuse Japan from its contractual obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol. Therefore, because these were force majeure events, Japan
should not be penalized for failing to meet its Kyoto Protocol carbon
emissions reduction targets or from withdrawing from the agreement as
it continues to restructure its energy portfolio to meet its people’s needs
in the wake of the Fukushima NPP disaster.

219. Serita & Xu, supra note 22, at 1.
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